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ABSTRACT
As China’s rapid economic growth continues to slow, the Chinese Communist Party
now seeks to promote innovation as the engine of future development. With this new
economic agenda, reforms to China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) regime have
emerged as a key policy domain as China attempts to build market-supporting
institutions and improve law enforcement capabilities. By reviewing the legal
frameworks supporting specific judicial reforms and through non-randomized, semistructured field interviews with lawyers, IP officials, and industry representatives,
this article analyzes how China’s evolving legal institutions are increasing central
control in the IP adjudication process, building judicial professionalism, and ensuring
uniformity in case outcomes in line with the demands of its economic transition. The
question of how IP rights are enforced in China is of interest not only to those who
want to understand how IP protections have developed in China, but also to those who
wish to analyze the role that law and the courts play in structuring central-local
relations and implementing institutional reform in a historically fragmented
authoritarian system. Although China’s IPR regime is far from perfect, these reforms
are indicative of a major initiative to improve IP protections, nurture domestic
innovation, and increase the role of China’s judicial system in efficiently resolving
disputes.
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IS THE EMPEROR STILL FAR AWAY? CENTRALIZATION, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND
UNIFORMITY IN CHINA’S INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REFORMS
WILLIAM WEIGHTMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
China is at a crossroads. Over the last four decades, it has experienced one of the
most rapid economic expansions in world history as the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP) successfully transitioned the country from an agrarian, centrally planned
communist regime to an industrial, market-oriented authoritarian state. China
achieved this economic success largely by allowing a constant flow of labor to migrate
from the countryside to the new industrial sector in the cities, making massive capital
investments, and pursuing a series of market-oriented institutional reforms that
allowed for entrepreneurship domestically and economic integration with the world.1
However, this development model has become increasingly unsustainable and growth
has continued to slow. Given these structural economic conditions, the CCP now seeks
to promote innovation as the engine of future growth. With this new economic agenda,
reforms to China’s intellectual property rights (IPR) regime have emerged as a key
policy domain as China attempts to build market-supporting institutions and improve
law enforcement capabilities.
Since 2003, real wages in rural China have risen sharply, wages between skilled
and unskilled labor have generally converged, and labor shortages have emerged in
urban sectors demonstrating that China’s original surplus of rural labor can no longer
fuel its urban-oriented growth model.2 Likewise, the global financial crisis showed the
risks associated with utilizing a development model too reliant on exports to fuel
growth. China’s export to GDP ratio fell from its peak of 36 percent in 2006 to about
24.5 percent in 2009 mostly due to the precipitous decline in global demand for Chinese
exports.3 However, as exports collapsed, the government attempted to bolster growth
through investment. This caused investment gluts to emerge across the economy, most

* © 2020 William Weightman. 2017-2018 Fulbright Fellow based in Chengdu, China, Analyst at
Kobre & Kim LLP. I would like to thank Professor Guo Hongling for hosting me and serving as my
advisor at Southwest Jiaotong University as well as Professor Liu Xin and Wang Juan for their
support on the ground. I would also like to thank Mark Jia and Beau Barnes for reviewing this article
and providing insightful feedback and Orion Lewis for his guidance and support throughout the
research process. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the UIC Review of Intellectual Property
Law for their time and effort publishing this piece. This research was funded by the U.S. Department
of State Fulbright Research Grant. All views and mistakes are my own.
1 See Shang-Jin Wei, Zhuan Xie & Xiaobo Zhang, China’s Transition to a More Innovative
Economy: Progress and Challenges, in CHINA’S NEW SOURCES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH: HUMAN
CAPITAL, INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 174 (Ligang Song et al. eds., 2d ed. 2017).
2 See Xiaobo Zhang, Jin Yang & Shenglin Wang, China Has Reached the Lewis Turning Point, 22
CHINA ECON. REV. 542, 542-543 (2011); see also Fang Cai & Yang Du, Wage Increases, Wage
Convergence, and the Lewis Turning Point in China, 22 CHINA ECON. REV. 601, 602 (2011).
3 WORLD BANK, World Bank National Accounts Data, Exports of Goods and Services (% of GDP),
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?end=2017&locations=CN&start=1960&view
=chart (last visited Feb. 9, 2020).
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notably in real estate, 4 infrastructure,5 and industrial capacity.6 Between 2007 and
2012, during the peak of the global financial crisis, China’s debt-to-GDP ratio increased
by 56 percentage points.7
It is in this rapidly changing macroeconomic environment that China’s leadership
has turned to innovation as the foundation for continued growth that will help China
avoid the “middle income trap” and become a global economic leader in the twenty-first
century.8 The most notable example of this goal was outlined in the 13th Five-Year
Plan, where the CCP set a target of having 60 percent of China’s economic growth come
from innovation by 2020.9 However, even with these ambitious policy targets, central
dictates are rarely effective if they are not made within an institutional environment
that allows them to be properly implemented.10

4 See Edward Glaeser et al., A Real Estate Boom with Chinese Characteristics, 31 J. ECON. PERSP.
93, 93-94 (2017) (conducting a statistical review of China’s real estate boom and the investment glut
that has emerged); see also Dinny McMahon, China’s Ghost Cities and Their Multi-billion Dollar Debt
are Raising Concerns, AUSTL. FIN. REV. (Apr. 6, 2018), https://www.afr.com/news/world/asia/chinasghost-cities-and-their-multibilliondollar-debt-20180404-h0ybjz
(analyzing
the
“ghost
city”
phenomenon in China).
5 See Atif Ansar et al., Does Infrastructure Investment Lead to Economic Growth or Economic
Fragility? Evidence from China, 32 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 360, 385 (2016) (finding that China’s
“poorly managed infrastructure investments are a main explanation of surfacing economic and
financial problems”).
6 See USHA C. V. HALEY & GEORGE T. HALEY, SUBSIDIES TO CHINESE INDUSTRY: STATE
CAPITALISM, BUSINESS STRATEGY, AND TRADE POLICY xvii (2013) (finding that a major cause of
China’s industrial overcapacity is due to the fact that 30 percent of industrial output in China received
some form of government subsidy, including cheap land and credit, discounted power costs, and tax
breaks).
7 Kenneth Ho et al., The China Credit Conundrum: Risks, Paths and Implications, GOLDMAN
SACHS PORTFOLIO STRATEGY RESEARCH (July 2013), http://pg.jrj.com.cn/acc/Res/CN_RES/INVEST/
2013/7/26/f9ab5c5e-8a91-4250-b9c6-e045d31459c2.pdf.
8 At the 19th Party Congress, Xi Jinping noted that “[i]nnovation is the primary driving force
behind development; it is the strategic underpinning for building a modernized economy.” Xi Jinping,
General Secretary, CCP, Annual Report to the 19th National Congress of the Chinese Communist
Party: Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive
for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era (Oct. 18, 2017),
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping's_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.
pdf.
9 See Shisanwu Guojia Keji Chuangxin Guihua (十三五国家科技创新规划) [13th Five-Year Plan
on National Science and Technology Innovation] (promulgated by the St. Council, July 28, 2016), ST.
COUNCIL, July 28, 2016, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2016/content_5103134.htm.
10 See Tucker Van Aken & Orion A. Lewis, The Political Economy of Noncompliance in China:
The Case of Industrial Energy Policy, 24 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 798, 800 (2015) (examining how
industrial energy intensity reduction policy compliance is determined by the regulatory autonomy,
regulatory capacity, and economic interests of local provincial governments); ELIZABETH ECONOMY,
THE RIVER RUNS BLACK: THE ENVIRONMENTAL CHALLENGE TO CHINA’S FUTURE 110 (2004) (noting
that local governments consider social, political, and economic conditions when determining industrial
regulatory policy and may have interests in not implementing central policy); Genia Kostka & Jonas
Nahm, Central–Local Relations: Recentralization and Environmental Governance in China, 231
CHINA Q. 567, 570 (2017) (noting that even when the central government pays closer attention to the
enforcement of environmental regulations, compliance is far from uniform and there is a large degree
of regional variation across China).
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There is a large literature arguing that effective legal institutions are essential
for good economic outcomes. 11 In terms of promoting innovation, a country’s IPR
regime is one of the most important of those institutions.12 An effective IPR regime is
essential for ensuring that creators are able to reap the benefits of their work while
simultaneously promoting the dissemination of new knowledge.13 Although these are
both important goals, there is a fundamental contradiction between them. If an IPR
regime is too strong, it could limit the economic benefits of innovation by preventing
the dissemination of knowledge and result in monopolistic behavior by IP holders.14 If,
on the other hand, an IPR regime is too weak, it could reduce innovation by failing to
protect the intellectual works of creators and result in misappropriation by those who
did not bear the costs of production.15
China has long been considered to be a country with weak formal institutions.16
This is particularly true in the case of its IPR regime, which is frequently maligned for
rampant infringement and its inadequate enforcement mechanisms. 17 However, in
recent years, China has engaged proactively in building formal market-supporting
institutions to ensure that IP policies are effectively enforced. By reviewing the legal
frameworks around judicial reforms and through non-randomized, semi-structured
field interviews with lawyers, IP officials, and industry representatives, this article
describes how China’s evolving legal institutions are increasing central control of the
IPR regime, building judicial professionalism, and ensuring uniformity in case
outcomes.18 These developments have enabled China to strengthen its IPR regime in
11 See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990) (analyzing how institutions and institutional change affect the performance of
economies); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (demonstrating
how different legal institutions impact investor rights and corporate governance); Daron Acemoglu,
Simon Johnson & James A. Robinson, The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An
Empirical Investigation, 91 AMERICAN ECON. REV. 1369 (2001) (using variation in European settler
mortality to analyze how different institutions impact current income per capita at the national level).
12 See Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An Introduction to the Law and Economics of
Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 5 (1991).
13 Keith E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Development, 32 CASE W. RES. J.
INT’L L. 471, 473 (2000).
14 Id. at 474.
15 Id.
16 See, e.g., Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in
China, 77 J. FIN. ECON. 57 (2005) (arguing that despite China’s weak formal legal rules and its
underdeveloped financial system, informal norms and mechanisms play an important role in
supporting growth); see also Yang Yao & Linda Yueh, Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China:
An Introduction, 37 WORLD DEV. 753, 760 (2009) (contending that the effectiveness of laws in fostering
growth is related to the underlying institutional arrangements in an economy); Hongbin Li et al.,
Political Connections, Financing and Firm Performance: Evidence from Chinese Private Firms, 87 J.
DEV. ECON. 283, 284 (2008) (finding that political connections in China affect firm performance
through a number of mechanisms that are related to China’s weak institutional environment).
17 See, e.g., Maskus, supra note 13, at 480 (noting how rampant trademark infringement
negatively impacted the brand reputation of Chinese enterprises); Lina Wang, Intellectual Property
Protection in China, 36 INT’L INFO. & LIBRARY REV. 253 (2004); James S. Ang, Chaopeng Wu &
Yingmei Cheng, Does Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights Matter in China? Evidence from
Financing and Investment Choices in the High-Tech Industry, 96 REV. ECON. & STAT. 332 (2014)
(noting that while China has uniform national IP laws, there are significant differences across
provinces in terms of local enforcement).
18 In order to conduct interviews for this research, I relied on personal networks to obtain initial
interviews, with additional interviews produced using the snowball sampling method. See, e.g., Nissim
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line with the demands of its economic transition. Although China’s IPR regime is far
from perfect, these reforms are indicative of a major initiative to improve IP
protections, nurture domestic innovation, and increase the role of China’s judicial
system in efficiently resolving disputes.
This article proceeds as follows: section II reviews some of the key explanations
for the current state of IPR enforcement in China, focusing on economic materialist
and cultural idealist explanations. Specifically, it examines how China’s domestic
institution building enables its IPR regime to align economic materialist interests with
institutional implementation. Section III provides a brief overview of the historical
development of China’s IPR regime and examines some of the literature on centrallocal relations in China’s governance institutions. This section also examines the
development of legality and the reliance on law as a source sociopolitical legitimacy in
China. Section IV describes some of the key judicial reforms China has undertaken to
strengthen its IPR regime and centralize control of the system. It specifically focuses
on how increasing central control, building judicial professionalism, and ensuring
uniformity in case outcomes has bridged the gap between China’s economic needs and
the successful implementation of institutional reform. Finally, section V concludes
with the implications of this study for China’s legal development and the role of its IPR
regime in meeting the necessities of its economic transition.
II. EXPLANATIONS FOR CHINA’S IPR REGIME
There is a large theoretical literature providing potential explanations for the
current state of IPR enforcement in China. In general, these can be broken down into
economic materialist explanations, which focus on how economic structure and social
organization impact IPR regimes, and cultural idealist explanations, which look to the
philosophical underpinnings and cultural values of societies to explain IPR regimes.
The economic materialist explanations for changes in IPR regimes posit that IPR
regimes are largely structured by domestic economic interests and international
pressures. 19 Because China’s early economic development relied on the mass
Cohen & Tamar Arieli, Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and
Snowball Sampling, 48 J. PEACE RES. 423–435 (2011) (noting the utility of using the snowball
sampling method in areas “characterized by less than optimal research conditions where other
methodologies are not applicable,” especially in conflict environments, among sensitive populations,
and even in authoritarian regimes). Additionally, this article includes a full list of interviewees (n=23)
contacted over the course of the research in table 4 of the Appendix, but identities have been
anonymized to incentivize the candidness of the answers and as a part of the ethics review for this
research. Citations to interview responses uses the coding provided in table 4. For example, CD0525182L, indicates that the interview was conducted in Chengdu, on May 25, 2018, was the second
interview conducted that day, and was with a lawyer.
19 See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA, 193 (Daniel Gervais, ed., 2007) (outlining the role of an internal
push and external pressure in China’s development of IP laws) [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property];
Mike W Peng et al., An Institution-Based View of Global IPR History, 48 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 893, 902
(2017) (arguing that as economies develop, “inventive capacity, wider diffusion of innovations, and
demands for high-quality products emerge” and domestic stakeholders’ interests shift to align with
building a stronger IPR regime).
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production of cheap goods for foreign markets, creating and enforcing a strict IPR
regime was neither profitable nor desirable.20 However, as the economy developed and
the economic structure began to have a higher proportion of IP-intensive industries,
domestic demand for stronger IP protections increased and local stakeholders emerged
who have an interest in enforcing a stronger IPR regime. In China, there has been a
simultaneous push from the government to align China’s IPR regime with its national
modernization goals as well as local industry stakeholders who want to take advantage
of stronger protections.21
Additionally, international pressures can also have a major impact on the
formation of the intellectual property laws that make up the institutional foundation
of an IPR regime. 22 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, lobbying by U.S. companies
mobilized the U.S. government to threaten China with sanctions, consider not
renewing China’s most-favored-nation status, and to oppose China’s entry into the
World Trade Organization (WTO). 23 Even after China’s WTO accession, one of the
main drivers of the current trade war between the U.S. and China has been the
perception that China lacks strong IP protections and maintains a policy of forced
technology transfers.24 Advanced economies have long pressured China to increase IP
protections for foreign firms and have been somewhat successful at shaping IP laws.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that sustained international pressures have shaped
China’s IP laws, these pressures have had little direct impact on enforcement, which
requires the support of local stakeholders to improve outcomes. Indeed, as Andrew
Mertha found in his study of the role of external pressure on China’s IPR enforcement
regime, it has been sustained pressure from inside China that has caused enforcement
efforts to increase. This is especially true when “foreign pressure and official policy
come into conflict with local incentives” because local incentive structures often win
out.25 Even so, it is still important to recognize that it was in response to pressure from
the United States and in preparation for accession to the WTO that China revamped
important aspects of the legal framework for its intellectual property system.26
While economic materialist explanations focus on the impact of economic
structure and political organization, cultural idealist explanations seek to explain the
development of IPR regimes in terms of the cultural legacies and philosophical
20 This developmental reality is in no way unique to China. As Peng et al. note, “Switzerland
rejected patent laws until 1888. Denmark had not enacted a patent law until 1894. The Netherlands
rescinded patent laws between 1869 and 1912, after a political victory of the free trade movement in
an effort to encourage technological imitation.” Peng, supra note 19, at 898.
21 See Yu, Intellectual Property, supra note 19, at 180-182, for a detailed examination of the role
of the software industry in pushing for stronger domestic IP reforms. This view has also been
supported by interviews with industry representatives for this research. Interview CD-0615182I said
that all major players in the industry rely heavily on IP and push for stronger IP protections as a key
part of their business strategy.
22 See Yu, Intellectual Property, supra note 19, at 174.
23 Id. at 186.
24 OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION INTO CHINA’S
ACTS, POLITICS, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND
INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 (Mar. 22, 2018), https://ustr.gov/aboutus/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/ 2018/march/section-301-report-chinas-acts.
25 ANDREW MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA 4 (2005).
26 Id.
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underpinnings of society. In the case of China, these explanations largely focus on
Confucianism and political culture as the main cause of China’s weak IPR regime.27
The argument that Confucianism and China’s traditional culture have prevented
it from developing indigenous institutions around intellectual property is based on
several core Confucian tenets. First, Confucian philosophy required that knowledge of
the past belong to all Chinese people.28 Because an understanding of the past is the
key to self-cultivation, granting intellectual property rights, which would allow a select
few to monopolize these needed materials, contradicted traditional Chinese moral
standards. 29 Second, copying and imitation were considered necessary aspects of
demonstrating respect for one’s ancestors and essential to signaling filial piety, moral
cultivation, and even for achieving extrinsic success through the national civil service
exams.30 Finally, these arguments emphasize that Confucian society places a higher
value on the collective than the individual and thus the Chinese did not develop a
notion of individual rights, especially as it relates to creativity.31
These explanations, however, contain a number of important weaknesses. Given
that past cultural values and philosophical systems are largely fixed, cultural idealist
explanations cannot explain the evolution or change in IPR regimes. If China’s weak
IPR regime is predicated on its Confucian culture, then the only way for China to
develop a stronger IPR regime is to eliminate the influence of Confucian values on
Chinese society. However, few would argue that China has eradicated the impact of
Confucian philosophy on Chinese society and yet, as this article discusses below, China
has experienced dramatic improvements to its IPR regime. In addition to failing to
explain the positive trends in China’s improving IP protections today, cultural idealist
explanations also fail to explain the strong IPR regimes in other Confucian societies

27 See, e.g., WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 19-29 (1995) (discussing how Confucian culture militated
against intellectual property reforms); Jessica Gisclair, The Dissonance between Culture and
Intellectual Property in China, 30 SE. REV. ASIAN STUD. 182-187 (2008) (arguing that a cultural
perspective of Confucian doctrine is reflected in China’s modern view of intellectual property among
CCP members). But see Wei Shi, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an
Elegant Offense, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 2-3 n.2 (2006) (providing a more expansive list of
the literature criticizing Confucian philosophy as the root of China’s IPR enforcement problem); Ken
Shao, Chinese Culture and Intellectual Property: Let’s Realise We Have Been Misguided, 4 WIPO J.
103 (2012) (criticizing cultural explanations for their misrepresentation of Chinese culture’s view of
creativity and knowledge creation); see also Geoffery T. Willard, An Examination of China’s Emerging
Intellectual Property Regime: Historical Underpinnings, the Current System and Prospects for the
Future, 6 IND. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 411, 417 (1996) (arguing that the cultural and political legacies
impact modern IP rights in China and “‘rights consciousness’ must be instilled in the Chinese people
and ingrained in their legal institutions”); Alan Zimmerman, Contending with Chinese Counterfeits:
Culture, Growth, and Management Responses, 56 BUS. HORIZONS 141, 142 (2013) (arguing that
“Chinese political culture did not lend itself to the concept of IP ownership”).
28 See ALFORD, supra note 27, at 26.
29 See Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey Mouse” in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting
U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. INT’L L.J. 81, 88 (1996).
30 See Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights in China, OCCASIONAL
PAPERS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY FROM BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO SCHOOL OF LAW, YESHIVA
UNIVERSITY, 17 (2002) [hereinafter Yu, Second Coming].
31 Id.
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like Singapore, Japan, and South Korea, which consistently rank among the top in the
world in terms of innovation and IP protection.32
While the economic materialist explanations have clear explanatory power, one
shortcoming is that they do not fully explain the processes that underlie the evolution
of IPR institutions and how these economic forces mobilize to meet the demands of
changing economic conditions. The under-theorization of the processes that link these
two variables is an important gap in the literature that needs to be addressed. This
article seeks to expand on this aspect of the literature by explaining how domestic
institution building enables IPR regimes to align economic interests with institutional
implementation. Specifically, this article examines how increasing central control,
building judicial professionalism, and ensuring uniformity in case outcomes have
enabled China to strengthen its IPR regime in line with the demands of its economic
transition. As economic development increases and demand for domestic IP protections
increases, intervening factors mediate the ability of IP institutions to adapt to the
changing environment. However, before we can examine these processes, it is
important to first understand the historical evolution of China’s IPR regime and the
role that its decentralized institutional environment play in the implementation of
reform.
III. IPR ENFORCEMENT AND CENTRAL-LOCAL RELATIONS
A. The Historical Evolution of China’s IPR Regime
History matters not only because we can learn from it but also because it shapes
the way institutions evolve.33 Thus, to a large extent, China’s current IPR regime is
shaped by its historical laws, jurisprudence, and legal enforcement mechanisms. First,
it is important to recognize that compared to developed western countries, China’s IPR
regime is relatively young. 34 The legal institution of intellectual property in the
modern sense was not introduced in China until the early twentieth century when
colonial powers used commercial treaties to force China to adopt them.35 In 1903, the
United States used its superior economic and military might to force China to sign the
32 See GLOBAL INNOVATION INDEX 2019: CREATING HEALTHY LIVES—THE FUTURE OF MEDICAL
INNOVATION xxii (Soumitra Dutta, Bruno Lanvin & Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, eds., 12th ed. 2018)
https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/home (last visited Feb. 10, 2020) (placing Singapore, Japan,
and South Korea as global leaders in innovation); Mei Pugatch & David Torstensson, Inspiring
Tomorrow: International IP Index, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE GLOBAL INNOVATION POLICY
CENTER (7th ed. 2019), https://www.theglobalipcenter.com/ipindex2020-chart/ (last visited Feb. 10,
2020) (placing Japan, South Korea, and Singapore as global leaders in IP protection and enforcement).
33 See NORTH, supra note 11, at vii.
34 See Can Huang, “Recent Development of the Intellectual Property Rights System in China and
Challenges Ahead,” 13 MGMT. & ORG. REV. 39, 40 (2017) (noting that compared with “industrialized
countries, such as Italy, the U.K., and the U.S., which have several centuries of history of developing
IPR protection, China has a young IPR system and only four decades of experience with using and
protecting IPR”).
35 See Raymond M. Gabriel, The Patent Revolution: Proposed Reforms in Chinese Intellectual
Property Law, Policy, and Practice are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection in China, 9 ASIANPACIFIC L. & POL’Y J. 324, 326 (2011).
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Treaty Between the United States and China for the Extension of the Commercial
Relations Between Them, which sought to protect United States trademarks, patents,
and copyrights from Chinese infringement.36 Despite the fact that pursuant to this
treaty China proceeded to introduce substantive copyright (1910), patent (1912), and
trademark (1923) laws, implementation was difficult and the laws were rarely
enforced.37 During the republican era (1912-1949), the Nationalist Party attempted to
reintroduce intellectual property protections, however, the decades of war, famine, and
revolution did not make a supportive institutional environment for legal reform.38
When the CCP came to power in 1949, they embarked on their agenda to construct
a socialist command economy. This required eliminating private property in all its
forms—including intellectual property. Indeed, in Maoist China “the very notion of
privately owned monopolies or exclusive rights in the use of expressions, ideas and
names became meaningless.” 39 In addition to dismantling private property, Mao’s
revolution also proceeded to dismantle courts and administrative bureaucracies.
During the Anti-Rightist Campaign of 1957-1958, which was launched in response to
the strong criticisms of the Party raised by the Hundred Flowers Movement, the CCP
was able to use mass mobilization to assume the dominant role in law enforcement and
supplant the courts.40 Furthermore, during the Cultural Revolution, Mao’s instruction
to the Red Guards to “smash the police, procuratorate, and courts” (砸烂公检法) played
an important role in purging the legal system of institutional power and ensuring that
what remained of the judicial system was responsive to the political demands of the
Party.41
Despite the failed attempts to transplant intellectual property laws in China
through commercial treaties during the imperial and republican periods and after the
legal tumult wrought by the Maoist regime, China began to lay the foundation for its
modern IPR regime around 1978 when Deng Xiaoping ushered in the era of reform and
opening. Although still a socialist economy, these IP laws were justified through the
idea that China needed to build an IPR regime to achieve its national economic
modernization and development goals.42 This allowed reform-minded leaders to push
through IP laws despite conservative opposition and build a framework for IP
protection around China’s national economic interest. Indeed, as Peter Yu notes,
“economic modernization provided the needed ‘social planning’ justification for a new
intellectual property system. Since then, intellectual property reforms have been

36 See Peter K. Yu, The Transplant and Transformation of Intellectual Property Laws in China,
in GOVERNANCE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND EUROPE, 20, 21 (Nari Lee, Niklas
Bruun & Li Mingde, eds., 2015); see also Treaty Between the United States and China for the
Extension of the Commercial Relations Between Them, China-U.S. Oct. 8, 1903 6 U.S.T. 695.
37 See Yu, Second Coming, supra note 30, at 21.
38 Id.
39 PETER FENG, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 3 (1997).
40 See Shao-Chuan Leng, Criminal Justice in Post-Mao China: Some Preliminary Observations,
73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 204, 205 (1982); Shao-Chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People’s
Republic of China as Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung’s Influence, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356, 358359 (1977).
41 Id.
42 Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS-PLUS ERA 193 (Daniel Gervais, ed., 2007).
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linked to the country’s rapid economic development and have benefited from the push
for continuous economic reforms.”43
Even though it is possible that stronger intellectual property protections might be
unnecessary for promoting economic growth in developing countries, “the claim that
stronger intellectual property protection would promote economic development
provided the needed internal push for intellectual property reforms in the first decade
and a half following the reopening of the Chinese market to foreign trade.” 44 This
internal push would become increasingly important as the Chinese economy continued
to develop and local stakeholders’ interests aligned with building a stronger IPR
regime to protect their innovations.45
B. Central-Local Relations and China’s Legal Institutions
Today, the problem is not that China does not have the laws to protect intellectual
property. As seen in table 1 and table 2, China has enacted domestic laws and acceded
to international treaties that put its IPR regime’s legal foundation on par with most
industrialized nations. As many have noted, the problem lies in enforcement.46 The
enforcement problem largely tracks with China’s fragmented and decentralized
political system, which creates ample space for local noncompliance. This intractable
problem has been a central concern in Chinese governance for centuries. Indeed, the
ability of local governments to circumvent central dictates is aptly characterized by the
classical proverb that “heaven is high and the emperor is far away” (天高皇帝远). While
it is true that China has always attempted to keep a highly centralized grip on political
power, the reform era saw the CCP attempt to use this fragmented structure to its
advantage by pursuing fiscal and administrative decentralization in order to stimulate
competition and economic growth among the provinces. 47 This institutional
environment—variously characterized in the literature as regionally decentralized

Id. at 191.
Id. at 193.
45 Id.
46 See Ang, Wu & Cheng, supra note 17, at 333; Yu, Intellectual Property, supra note 19, at 174;
Nathan W. Snyder, Putting Numbers to Feelings: Intellectual Property Rights Enforcement in China’s
Courts-Evidence from Zhejiang Province Trademark Infringement Cases 2004-2009, 10 NW. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP 349, 349 (2012).
47 See Hongbin Cai & Daniel Treisman, Did Government Decentralization Cause China’s
Economic Miracle?, 58 WORLD POL. 505, 507-508 (2006) (distinguishing between administrative,
political, and fiscal decentralization). Administrative decentralization refers to the devolution of
central authority to subnational governments to make certain policy decisions subject to review and
possible veto from above. Political decentralization is used to describe the phenomenon where
subnational governments have the right to make certain policy decisions independent from higherlevel political authorities and/or when subnational officials are chosen by local residents rather than
by higher-level officials. Finally, Fiscal decentralization is defined as the process through which
government revenues and expenditures are allocated across different levels of government, with local
revenue and expenditures taking up a larger share of the total government budget. China’s
decentralized authoritarianism has embraced administrative and fiscal decentralization while
keeping a highly centralized political system. This has important implications for China’s economic
development as well as its ability to implement policy at the local level.
43
44
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authoritarianism, 48 decentralized
experimentation, 49
and
fragmented
50
authoritarianism —means that while the central government sets the agenda and
creates political objectives, they still rely on the localities to implement and enforce
them. 51 As Van Aken and Lewis demonstrate in their study of energy intensity
reduction policy, this fragmented and decentralized institutional framework creates
space for local regulatory autonomy and local noncompliance with central directives.52
In addition to its implications for regulatory policies, this framework also applies
to China’s legal institutions. Despite the fact that the CCP has begun promoting the
idea of “socialist rule of law” (社会主义法治) and “governing the country with law” (依
法治国)53 as a method for creating the semblance of rule by law in the judiciary, in
many ways China’s judges “are more like bureaucratic actors or civil servants within
a tightly party-controlled hierarchy than independent adjudicators.” 54 This fits
squarely within China’s bureaucratic and socialist traditions as well as its
instrumentalist view of law as a tool for achieving substantive objectives like social
stability and harmony.55 This lack of judicial independence has caused local courts to
become beholden to the economic policy interests of local party and state officials. As a
result of the fiscal and administrative decentralization promoted during the reform
era, local governments had a clear economic interest in protecting local firms and stateowned enterprises as the base of their political and economic power.56 Because judges
are selected by local CCP officials, appointed by local people’s congresses and
supervised by local CCP political and legal affairs committees (政法委员会), it is quite
easy for local officials to pressure courts to provide favorable rulings for and impede
enforcement against local economic champions.57
48 See Chenggang Xu, The Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 1079, 1082 (2011)
49 See Sebastian Heilmann, From Local Experiments to National Policy: The Origins of China’s
Distinctive Policy Process, 59 CHINA J. 1, 1 (2008).
50 See
Kenneth Lieberthal & David M. Lampton, Introduction: The “Fragmented
Authoritarianism” Model and its Limitations, in BUREAUCRACY, POLITICS, AND DECISION MAKING IN
POST-MAO CHINA 9 (Kenneth Lieberthal & David M. Lampton, eds., 1992).
51 Van Aken & Lewis, supra note 10, at 799-800.
52 Id. at 799-803.
53 These terms gained wide support by the 4th Plenary Session of the 18th CCP Central
Committee. See Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shiba Miao Zhongyang Weiyuanhui Di Si Ci Quanti
Huiyi Gongbao (中国共产党第十八届中央委员会第四次全体会议公报) [Communique of the 4th Plenary
Session of the 18th CCP Central Committee] (adopted Oct. 23, 2014), CCP CENT. COMM., Oct. 23,
2014, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/1023/c64094-25896724.html; see also Susan Trevaskes, A Law
Unto Itself: Chinese Communist Party Leadership and Yifa Zhiguo in the Xi Era, 44 MOD. CHINA 347,
348 (2018) (noting that in the Xi Jinping era, “yifa zhiguo is predominantly about fortifying and
legitimizing the CCP’s leadership through law over state institutions”).
54 Margaret Woo, Court Reform with Chinese Characteristics, 27 WASH. INT’L L. J. 241, 244 (2017).
55 Id. at 242. See also Shao-Chuan Leng, The Role of Law in the People’s Republic of China as
Reflecting Mao Tse-Tung’s Influence, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 356, 373 (1977) (concluding that
Maoist philosophy heavily influenced China’s use of law as “an instrument of social engineering”);
Benjamin L. Liebman, A Return to Populist Legality? Historical Legacies and Legal Reform, in MAO’S
INVISIBLE HAND: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ADAPTIVE GOVERNANCE IN CHINA 165 (Sebastian
Heilmann & Elizabeth J. Perry eds., 2011) (noting that an instrumentalist approach to law continues
to dominate during the reform era as a tool for CCP policy).
56 See Woo, supra note 54, at 250.
57 See Nari Lee & Liguo Zhang, Specialized IP Courts in China - Judicial Governance of
Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 900, 910 (2017).
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Importantly, The Supreme People’s Court’s First Five-Year Court Reform
Program (1999-2003) not only emphasized the importance of counteracting local
judicial protectionism, but also emphasized that the lack of professionalization in the
judiciary, the lack of judicial independence caused by the bureaucratic management
structure, and the lack of financial support for courts to carry out their core functions
are major problems in China’s judicial system.58 These issues have been and continue
to be major obstacles in enforcing laws in China in general and IP laws in particular.
From ensuring regulatory compliance in environmental policy to rooting out local
protectionism in the judiciary, local autonomy and noncompliance have posed some of
the greatest challenges for the central government in terms of policy implementation.
Since taking office in 2012, however, General Secretary Xi Jinping has made great
efforts to recentralize fiscal and administrative powers to ensure compliance with and
enforcement of central directives.59 Importantly, General Secretary Xi has promoted a
centralized policymaking process known as “top-level design” (顶层设计) to guide
reforms during his tenure. 60 As Stepan observes, although this process “may help
correct past distortions caused by uneven policy implementation and resource
distribution, it also risks to stifle innovation and to decrease effective governance.”61
Furthermore, Xi’s anti-corruption campaign has grown more powerful under the
National Supervisory Commission, a new agency that expands the anti-corruption
campaign’s scope from weeding out corruption exclusively in the CCP to fighting
corruption in both the Party and the state. 62 This has enabled the CCP’s central
leadership to institutionalize oversight and administrative control over local officials
into state governance. Despite frequently being considered a detriment to China’s
innovation ecosystem 63 and a hindrance to achieving its development goals in the
administrative policy literature, increased central control over IP adjudication has
created benefits for IP enforcement and policy compliance without the corresponding
cost of ineffective governance.

58 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa 《Renmin Fayuan Wunian Gaige Gangyao》 de Tongzhi
(最高人民法院关于印发《人民法院五年改革纲要》的通知) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on
Printing Distributing the Outline of the Five-Year Reform of the People’s Court], (adopted by the Sup.
People’s Ct., Oct. 20, 1999) SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2013/04/
id/941425.shtml. Despite identifying the core problems, reforms to address them have largely been
ineffective. See, e.g., Qianfan Zhang, Judicial Reform in China: An Overview, in CHINA’S SOCIALIST
RULE OF LAW REFORMS UNDER XI JINPING 17-29 (John Garrick & Yan Chang Bennett eds., 2016).
59 Jessica C. Teets, Reza Hasmath & Orion A. Lewis, The Incentive to Innovate? The Behavior of
Local Policymakers in China, 22 J. CHINESE POL. SCI. 505, 505 (2017); Kostka & Nahm, supra note
10, at 567.
60 Barry Naughton, Leadership Transition and the “Top-Level Design” of Economic Reform, 37
CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR 1, 2 (Apr. 30, 2012).
61 Matthias Stepan, What Does Xi Jinping’s Top-Down Leadership Mean for Innovation in
China?, CHINAFILE (Oct. 25, 2016), http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-does-xi-jinpings-topdown-leadership-mean-innovation-china.
62 See William Weightman, Xi Cracks down on Local Governments’ Compliance and Creativity, E.
ASIA F. (June 14, 2018), http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/06/14/xi-cracks-down-on-local-govern
ments-compliance-and-creativity/.
63 Regina M. Abrami, William C. Kirby & F. Warren McFarlan, Why China Can’t Innovate, 92
HARV. BUS. REV. 107, 107-111 (2014).
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C. Legality in China’s Judicial Reforms
While most studies in the policy literature have emphasized the importance of
central-local relations in China’s administrative state, these processes also have clear
applications for China’s legal institutions more broadly as well as its IPR regime in
particular. A large part of the literature on the role of law in China’s political system
note that, although China had largely pursued a strategy of enhancing judicial and
legal mechanisms for dispute resolution in the 1980s and 1990s, China has made a
“turn against law” during the twenty-first century. 64 Some have used Xi Jinping’s
recentralization of administrative power and abolishment of presidential term limits
as a clear indicator that China’s resurgent authoritarianism is destroying the political
and legal norms that formed the foundations for its remarkable growth and stability
over the last four decades.65
However, recent scholarship has argued that, contrary to the common perspective
on legality in Chinese politics, China’s recentralization of administrative
bureaucracies does not represent a turn against law, but rather a turn towards law
necessitated by emerging governance imperatives.66 As Zhang and Ginsburg observe,
there is an inherent tradeoff between allowing for a certain degree of local autonomy
in a decentralized administrative system (i.e. de-facto federalism) and ensuring
centralized rule through rigorous law enforcement. 67 This dichotomy takes on new
significance in the Xi Jinping era, where increasing centralization has required that
the Chinese state pursue a strategy of enhancing central control through legal reform
and bureaucratization. 68 China’s recent pursuit of centralization and legalization
represents a new strategy to address the challenges of governing a large and populous
country, manage the unique issues of a rapidly changing post-communist political
economy, and adapt institutions to achieve the increasing sociopolitical legitimacy
granted to law and legal institutions in China today.69
The nature of IP reform provides an interesting case with which to examine these
trends in China’s use of law in governance. Many of China’s IP judicial reforms have
centered on the goals of increasing uniformity, efficiency, and professionalism through
the process of centralization. While these reforms clearly fall within the CCP’s policy
objective of protecting IP rights in order to boost domestic innovation, it does not follow
that increasing centralization represents a turn against law in the terms discussed
above. Indeed, much of the recent scholarship on the use of law and judicial institutions

64 See Carl Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 935, 937-38 (2011) (noting
that China’s turn against law is “tied to a politicized rejection of many legal reforms advanced in the
1980s and 1990s” as well as “a top-down authoritarian political reaction to growing levels of social
protest and conflict in the Chinese system”). For an in-depth review of the strand of the literature
arguing that China has taken a turn against law, see Taisu Zhang & Tom Ginsburg, Legality in
Contemporary Chinese Politics, 59 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2019).
65 See, e.g., CARL F. MINZNER, END OF AN ERA: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN REVIVAL IS
UNDERMINING ITS RISE (2018).
66 Zhang & Ginsburg, supra note 64.
67 Id. at n. 1.
68 Id.
69 Id.
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in authoritarian regimes demonstrates the important role they play.70 Based on the
case of IP judicial reform in China, which will be discussed in the next section, it is
clear that China hopes to achieve the CCP leadership’s policy goals by relying more
heavily on the legitimizing forces of legality rather than turning against it.
IV. CENTRALIZATION, PROFESSIONALIZATION, AND UNIFORMITY
Since releasing the Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy
(“National IP Strategy”) in 2008, China has made important progress on building its
capacity to “create, utilize, protect and administer its intellectual property system.”71
In fact, in recent years China has seen an explosion in IP filings and litigation. In 2017
China received over 1.38 million invention patent applications (up 14.2 percent yearon-year)72 and registered over 5.7 million trademarks, (up 55.7 percent year-on-year).73
Furthermore, litigation has become an increasingly used dispute resolution
mechanism. Between 2009 and 2017, Chinese courts saw their IP caseloads increase
by almost 675 percent with civil (figure 1) and copyright (figure 2) cases being the main
drivers. 74 In 2017 alone, Chinese courts heard over 191,223 first instance patent,
trademark, and copyright cases. For comparison, United States courts heard only
11,561 cases total in the same year.75 Following the National IP Strategy’s call for the
“judicial protection of IPR to play a leading role,” China has engaged in several judicial
reforms to centralize authority, create case uniformity, and build professionalism
within the IP adjudication system. This section will address a number of important IP
reforms, examine how they create a greater level of central control over the IPR regime,
and explain how they strengthen IP protections across the country.
A. Creation of Specialized IP Courts
One of China’s biggest challenges is maintaining central control over competing
regional interests. In terms of IP law, it is ensuring that local courts rule fairly and
professionally according to law. In order to achieve this, China has attempted to
centralize adjudicative power into specialized IP courts and tribunals. The main
70 See, e.g., Peter H. Solomon, Courts and Judges in Authoritarian Regimes, 60 WORLD POL. 122
(2007); RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES (Tom Ginsburg & Tamir
Moustafa eds., 2008).
71 Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Zhanlüe Gangyao (国家知识产权战略纲要) [Outline of the National
Intellectual Property Strategy] (promulgated by the St. Council June 5, 2008, effective June 25, 2008),
ST. COUNCIL, June 5, 2008, http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=859.
72 Xin Wang, SIPO: Invention Patent Applications Surge in 2017, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 11, 2018),
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2018-01/11/content_35479464.
73 Chengcheng, China’s Trademark Applications Hit Record High in 2017, XINHUA (Jan. 31,
2018), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-01/20/c_136911172.
74 For comparison, overall court cases only increased 80 percent between 2009 and 2016. See
Zhongguo Fayuan Zhishi Chanquan Sifa Baohu Zhuangkuang (中国法院知识产权司法保护状况) [White
Paper on the Status of the Judicial Protection of Intellectual Property Rights in Chinese Courts]
(various years) SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-153242.html.
75 Brian Howard, Lex Machina Q4 2017 End of the Year Litigation Update, LEX MACHINA (Jan.
16, 2018), https://lexmachina.com/lex-machina-q4-litigation-update/.
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motivation for these reforms is to fight local protectionism by taking cases out of local
jurisdiction while simultaneously increasing the technical ability and professionalism
of judges in the IP adjudication system. 76 Many lawyers acknowledged that while
protectionism is still prevalent in local courts, it is far less prevalent at higher levels
as the judges are of a much higher caliber. 77 This fact has also been supported
quantitatively. Long and Wang found that in China, plaintiffs litigating IP cases in
their hometown are significantly more likely to win, however, when cases are appealed
to the higher courts (i.e. to the provincial level), plaintiff location no longer has a
significant effect on case outcome.78
In response to these problems, the National People’s Congress promulgated a
decision to create three specialized IP courts in August 2014 79 and the Supreme
People’s Court (SPC) issued provisions providing additional regulatory guidance on
court jurisdiction in October 2014. 80 One of the main concerns when establishing
specialized IP courts—especially in developing countries—is that the cost of starting
and operating them will outweigh the economic benefit of litigating IP cases.81 Thus,
in order to maximize the practical effect of these new IP courts, China focused reforms
on geographies with high IP caseloads in large urban centers along China’s coast.
Importantly, before these reforms were implemented, by 2010, courts in Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangzhou already received over half of all IP cases filed in China.82
In terms of their structure, these specialized IP courts sit at the intermediate
court level83 and have first instance jurisdiction over all technically complex civil and
administrative IP cases (including patents, new plant varieties, integrated circuit
layout designs, trade secrets, and computer software).84 They also have first instance
Interview CD-0621181L.
Interviews CD-0525182L, BJ-0419182L, CD-0619181L, and CD-0629182U.
78 See Cheryl Xiaoning Long & Jun Wang, Judicial Local Protectionism in China: An Empirical
Study of IP Cases, 42 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 48, 58-59 (2015).
79 Quanguo Renmin Daibiao Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Zai Beijing, Shanghai,
Guangzhou Sheli Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan de Jueding (全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于在北京、上
海、广州设立知识产权法院的决定) [Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s
Congress on the Establishment of Intellectual Property Courts in Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.) (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2014), STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG., Aug. 31, 2014, http://
www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/2014-09/01/content_1877042.htm.
80 Zuigao Remin Fayuan Guanyu Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan
Anjian Guanxia de Guiding ( 最 高 人 民 法 院 关 于 北 京 、 上 海 、 广 州 知 识 产 权 法 院 案 件 管 辖 的 规 定 )
[Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on the Jurisdiction of Cases of Intellectual Property Courts
in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 27, 2014, effective
Nov. 3, 2014), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., Oct. 31, 2014, https://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/2014/10/id/14
7980 [hereinafter SPC Jurisdiction Provisions].
81 See Xavier Seuba, Christophe Geiger, & Linhua Lu, The Evaluation and Modernisation of the
Legal Framework for the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, CTR. INT’L INTELL. PROP.,
Research Paper no. 2016–02, (2016).
82 See Lee & Zhang, supra note 57, at 910.
83 China’s judiciary has four levels: Basic People’s Courts at the county/district level,
Intermediate People’s Courts at the prefecture level, Higher People’s Courts at the provincial level,
and the Supreme People’s Court at the national level. The court of first instance is the trial court and
the court of second instance is the court of appeal and the court of last instance. However, cases
deemed to have errors can apply for a retrial at the next level. Additionally, IP cases are filed in
jurisdictions where the defendant resides or where the act of infringement occurred.
84 SPC Jurisdiction Provisions, supra note 80, at art. 1.
76
77
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jurisdiction over well-known trademarks85 and deal with all other IP cases upon appeal
from the basic people’s courts in their province.86 In terms of administrative law, the
Beijing IP Court also has special, first-instance jurisdiction over administrative
appeals brought against decisions issued by administrative IP adjudication bodies.87
In order to further centralize adjudicative authority in the specialized IP courts,
the SPC also determined that all of the intermediate people’s courts in Beijing,
Shanghai, and Guangdong could no longer accept civil and administrative IP cases and
must grant jurisdiction to the specialized IP court even if the case would normally fall
under their jurisdiction in other circumstances. 88 Appeals from the IP courts were
initially handled by the provincial-level higher people’s court within the same
geographic jurisdiction, however, this has changed due to the founding of a National
IP Appellate Tribunal within the SPC, which will be discussed further below.89
The specialized IP courts have been very successful at implementing changes to
substantive rules and procedures with a major impact on IP adjudication in China. In
2016, the Beijing IP Court ruled in favor of Watchdata System Co., Ltd. and ordered
Hengbao Co., Ltd. to pay 49 million RMB in damages for a patent infringement plus
an additional 1 million RMB in legal fees (for a total of approximately US $7.2
million)—the highest penalty ever issued by a one of the newly created IP courts and
the third highest ever in China for IP infringement. 90 This case was not only
noteworthy for the large damage award, but also for the way in which the Beijing IP
Court actually gathered sales data to estimate damages. While most courts rely on
statutory damage amounts to determine awards due to the lack of a formal discovery
process in China, the Beijing IP Court identified actual sales data for the infringing
products gathered from 15 banks and the defendant’s suppliers.
These evidentiary challenges have been further strengthened by decisions from
the Shanghai IP Court. Because China does not have a formal process of discovery, the
burden to provide evidence of infringement falls on the plaintiff.91 In the Beijing IP
Court case, the court was able to obtain the data needed to calculate damages,
however, one danger that remains is that defendants may attempt to destroy or hide
85 See Zhongguo Renmin Gonghe Guo Shangbiao Fa (中国人民共和国商标法) [Trademark Law of
the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 22,
1982, effective Feb. 28, 1983, amended Aug. 30, 2013), art. 14, STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S
CONG., https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/legislation/details/13198 (stating that factors used for establishing
a well-known mark include the “(l) reputation of the mark to the relevant public; (2) time for continued
use of the mark; (3) consecutive time, extent and geographical area of advertisement of the mark; (4)
records of protection of the mark as a well-known mark; and (5) any other factors relevant to the
reputation of the mark”).
86 SPC Jurisdiction Provisions, supra note 80, at art. 1.
87 Id. at art. 5.
88 Id. at art. 3.
89 Id. at art. 7.
90 Beijing Woji Shuju Xitong Youxian Gongsi, Hengbao Gufen Youxian Gongsi Faming Zhuanli
Qinquan Anjian (北京握奇数据系统有限公司诉恒宝股份有限公司发明专利侵权案件) [Beijing Watchdata
Data Systems Co. Ltd. v. Hengbao Co., Ltd. Invention Patent Infringement Case] BEIJING INTELL.
PROP. CT., Dec. 12, 2016, https://v1.iphouse.cn/ cases/detail/303194.html; see also Zhang Zhao, Beijing
Court Hands Down Highest Ever Compensation Order, XINHUA (Dec. 14, 2016), http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2016-12/14/content_27661840.htm
91 Elizabeth Fahey & Zhirong Tao, The Pretrial Discovery Process in Civil Cases: A Comparison
of Evidence Discovery Between China and the United States, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 281, 281–
82 (2014).
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evidence. The Shanghai IP Court heard a request for evidence preservation from U.S.based Adobe Inc. and Autodesk Systems Inc. against Shanghai-based Ablues Design
Exhibition Co., Ltd.92 The American companies argued that the defendant had copied
and commercially used their software without authorization. The Shanghai IP Court
ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and ordered technical experts to preserve evidence on
almost 400 computers in the Ablues offices. Importantly, this intervention enabled
Adobe and Autodesk to preserve evidence that would be crucial to proving the
infringement.
In addition to the changes in the methods for calculating damage awards and
preserving evidence, the IP courts have also taken important steps to prevent harm to
IP holders by issuing interim injunctions. As many lawyers practicing IP law in China
noted, while it is common to get injunctions as a form of relief at the end of the case,
preliminary and interim injunctions are incredibly rare.93 The Guangzhou IP Court
has taken an important step of granting an interim injunction to Blizzard
Entertainment against Chengdu Qiyou and Rekoo for allegedly distributing and
promoting an infringing copy of World of Warcraft.94 In order to secure the interim
injunction, the plaintiffs offered a 10 million RMB cash guarantee. The specialized IP
courts have prioritized providing injunctive relief in IP disputes, especially given that
it is an important remedy that has been underutilized as a whole in China.
B. Creation of the Specialized IP Tribunals
After the successful implementation of the specialized IP courts, the SPC has
further centralized adjudication authority by introducing 18 specialized IP tribunals
across the country since 2017 (table 3). Although these tribunals are administratively
a part of the intermediate people’s court in their city, they have cross-regional and
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over IP cases—similar to the IP courts established
in 2014. Provinces with only one IP tribunal, such as the Chengdu IP Tribunal in
Sichuan, have cross-regional jurisdiction over the entire province while provinces with
multiple IP tribunals split jurisdiction based on prefecture. For example, Jiangsu has
two IP tribunals: one in Nanjing and one in Suzhou. The Nanjing IP Tribunal has
jurisdiction over nine prefecture-level regions while the Suzhou IP Tribunal has
jurisdiction over four prefecture-level regions (table 3). Additionally, because
Guangdong already has the Guangzhou IP Court, Shenzhen is the only city with an IP
tribunal that does not have cross-regional jurisdiction and only hears cases in its
prefecture. Finally, the IP tribunals have their own tribunal building physically
separate from their respective intermediate court. Many believe that these tribunals
92 Anli 11: Shenqingren Outeke Gongsi, Aoduobi Gongsi Shenqing Suqian Zhengjuquan Anjian (
案例 11：申请人欧特克公司、奥多比公司申请诉前证据保全案) [Case 11: Autodesk, Adobe Apply for
Pretrial Evidence Preservation] SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. Sept. 9, 2015, http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiang
qing-15370.html.
93 Interviews CD-0619181L, SH-0407181L, and CD-0629182U.
94 Anli 14: Baoxue Yule Youxian Gongsi, Shanghai Wang Zhi Yi Wangluo Keji Fazhan Youxian
Gongsi Shenqing Linshi Jinling (案例 14：暴雪娱乐有限公司、上海网之易网络科技发展有限公司申请临
时 禁 令 ) [Case 14: Blizzard Entertainment Co., Ltd., Shanghai EaseNet Network Technology
Development Co., Ltd. Apply for Interim Injunction] SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., Sept. 9, 2015, http://www.
court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-15370.html.
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are being set up with separate facilities with the intent of expanding them into fullfledged IP courts in the future.95
Importantly, the expansion of the IP courts and tribunals has already achieved
broad coverage of IP litigation. As seen in table 3, three IP courts and 20 IP tribunals
have been established in 18 provinces across the country. While IP caseloads are not
equally distributed across geographies, these courts and tribunals now cover over 90
percent of IP cases filed in 2017.96 This, in and of itself, is a major change in the way
IP cases are litigated in China.
In addition to case coverage, the expansion of the IP courts and tribunals have
centralized adjudicative powers. Take for example the number of courts with
jurisdiction over patent cases, which are frequently the most technically complex IP
cases. According to SPC provisions published in 2015, all patent dispute cases are
brought to the intermediate people’s court of the provincial capital or to other
intermediate people’s courts designated by the SPC. 97 Since the expansion of IP
tribunals, the number of intermediate courts with jurisdiction over patent cases has
decreased by 55 percent.98 Effectively, by creating specialized IP courts and tribunals
with cross-regional jurisdiction over important IP cases, China has centralized IP
adjudication authority in specialized judicial bodies while stripping local courts of their
authority to influence case outcome.99
In addition to creating these new institutions to address the shifting needs of
China’s economic reforms, China has also attempted to increase the level of
professionalism in the IP adjudication process. In order to accomplish this goal, the
SPC issued Guiding Opinions on Selecting and Appointing Judges for Intellectual
Property Courts. 100 This Opinion set out the rules for selecting judges for the
specialized IP courts and tribunals. Importantly, these legal bodies must draw from

95 See, e.g., Chengdu Zhishi Chanquan Shenpanting Kai Shen Kua Quyu Jizhong Guanxia Hou
Di Yi An (成都知识产权审判庭开审跨区域集中管辖后第一案) [Chengdu IP Tribunal tried its first case
of cross regional centralized jurisdiction], SICHUAN DAILY (Mar. 1, 2017), epaper.scdaily.cn/shtml/
scrb/20170301/156156.shtml (quoting Yang Yongmei, President of the Chengdu IP Tribunal saying
“[t]he Tribunal will gradually consolidate 16 posts, laying the foundation for the establishment of the
Chengdu Intellectual Property Court in the future”).
96 This number was calculated using a search for the number of IP decisions by province in 2017
on the SPC’s online judgment website: wenshu.court.gov.cn.
97 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Zhuanli Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Wenti de Ruogan
Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理专利纠纷案件适用法律问题的若干规定) [Several Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court on Issues concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Cases on Patent
Disputes] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., June 19, 2001, revised Oct. 21, 2015, effective Feb.
21, 2015), http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/zcfgflfg/flfgzl/zlsfjs/1020171.htm.
98 Prior to the IP tribunal reforms in 2017, there were 82 intermediate people’s courts with firstinstance jurisdiction over patent cases. See Wang Hai, Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zhiding de Juyou
Zhuanli Jiufen Di Yi Shen Anjian Guanxiaquan de Fayuan (最高人民法院指定的具有专利纠纷第一审案
件管辖权的法院) [Courts Designated Jurisdiction Over First-Instance Patent Dispute Cases by the
Supreme People's Court], SINA (Aug. 11, 2014), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_6cd41f290102uyty.html.
After adding the 18 IP tribunals, there were only 46 courts with jurisdiction.
99 Interviews SH-0407181L and CD-0523181L.
100 Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan Faguan Xuanren Gongzuo Zhidao Yijian (Shixing) (知识产权法院法
官选任工作指导意见（试行）) [Notice of the Supreme People’s Court on Issuing the Guiding Opinions
on Selecting and Appointing Judges for Intellectual Property Right Courts (for Trial
Implementation)], (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.chinacourt.org/
article/ detail/2014/11/id/1474356.shtml.
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experienced judges at the intermediate court level.101 The IP courts require that judges
have level four senior judge status (四级高级法官任职资格), more than 6 years of
relevant trial work experience with IP cases, a minimum of a bachelor’s degree in law,
and a strong ability to preside over trials and write court judgments.102 While many
still believe that China’s judges lack a sufficient education, survey research has found
that the vast majority of judges in China already have a bachelor’s degree or above.103
Although this is much better than before, the specialized IP courts have even more
highly educated judges. In 2015, 91 percent of judges at the Beijing IP Court had at
least a master’s degree in law.104 This is similarly true for the IP tribunals. All of the
judges appointed to the Nanjing IP Tribunal have a master’s degree or above in
addition to having over 10 years’ experience adjudicating IP cases.105 Even most of the
judges at the Chengdu IP Tribunal have master’s degrees, despite the fact that
Sichuan does not have as strong of an IP litigation system as other provinces with
tribunals. The high levels of education and experience required of IP judges in the
courts and tribunals has raised the level of professionalism within the court and given
more confidence to litigants that their cases will be handled fairly and efficiently.106
C. Creation of the SPC IP Appellate Tribunal
There has long been significant discussion of establishing an IP appellate court
with national subject matter jurisdiction over IP cases in China (similar to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit). 107 Many high-ranking officials have
indicated that this is a top priority. Tao Kaiyuan, the Vice President and the Chief
Justice in charge of IP cases at the Supreme People’s Court,108 Han Xiaowu, a member
of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, 109 and Zhang Qin, a
Id.
Id.
103 Hu Changming (胡昌明), Zhongguo Faguan Zhiye Manyidu Kaocha — Yi 2660 Fen Wenjuan
Wei Yangben de Fenxi (中国法官职业满意度考察—以 2660 份问卷为样本的分析) [A Survey of Career
Satisfaction of Judges in China — An Analysis of a 2660 Judge Sample], 4 Zhongguo Falü Pinglun (
中国法律评论) [CHINA L. REV.], 194, 194-206 (2015) (noting that according to the survey data, 97.85
percent of judges have a bachelors or above (with 33.05 percent have a master’s degree and 1.32
percent having a PhD)).
104 Beijing Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan Yuanzhang Su Chi Fabu Beijing Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan
Gongzuo Yunxing Qingkuang (北京知识产权法院院长宿迟发布北京知识产权法院工作运行情况) [Beijing
IP Court President Su Chi Releases the Beijing IP Court Work Report] SUP. PEOPLE’S CT. (Sept. 9,
2015), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-15367.html.
105 Nanjing Zhishi Chanquan Fating Guapai Chenglile, Daodi You Shenme Zhineng? (南京知识产
权法庭挂牌成立了，到底有什么职能?) [The Nanjing IP Tribunal Was Established, What Functions
Does It Have?], ZHICHANLI (Jan. 20, 2017), http://news. zhichanli.cn/article/3394.html.
106 Interviews CD-0612182I, CD-0615182I, and CD-0615181I.
107 Danny Friedmann, IP in China Closer to Common Law System for the Sake of Uniformity, 12
J. INTELL. PROP. L. & PRAC. 621, 621–22. (2017).
108 Liu Ziyang (刘子阳), Zuigao Fa Tansuo Jianli Zhishi Chanquan Shangsu Fayuan (最高法探索
建立知识产权上诉法院) [The Supreme People’s Court Explores Establishing an Intellectual Property
Appellate Court], LEGAL DAILY (Dec. 20, 2016), http://ip.people.com.cn/n1/2016/1220/c136655-28962
191.html.
109 Hu Yongping (胡 永 平 ), Han Xiaowu Weiyuan: Jianyi Zai Woguo Sheli Zhishi Chanquan
Shangsu Fayuan (韩晓武委员：建议在我国设立知识产权上诉法院) [Committee Member Han Xiaowu:
101
102
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member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and former vicechairman of the Chinese Association for Science and Technology110 have all publicly
voiced support for the creation of an IP appellate court.
Finally, on January 1, 2019, the SPC established an appellate-level intellectual
property tribunal to handle appeals against first-instance decisions and rulings for
infringement and ownership disputes, reexamination and invalidation disputes, and
judicial review decisions for administrative rulings made by government
departments.111 The Tribunal also has subject matter jurisdiction over invention and
utility model patents, new plant varieties, integrated circuit layout designs, technical
secrets, computer software, and antitrust disputes appealed from all higher people’s
courts, specialized IP courts, and intermediate people’s courts.112
Importantly, the SPC IP Tribunal will continue the process of judicial
centralization and increase case uniformity. Prior to the establishment of the SPC IP
Tribunal, IP cases were heard at the prefecture-level intermediate people’s court and
could be appealed to the provincial-level higher people’s court. While creating the
specialized IP courts and tribunals at the intermediate court level has helped improve
the judicial system’s ability to manage IP caseloads, this structure could still lead to
splits in how the law is being applied in different provinces as well as the opportunity
for forum shopping as certain courts are known to rule more favorably for either
plaintiffs or defendants. 113 With the new SPC IP Appellate Tribunal in place, the
disparate decisions of provincial-level higher people’s courts will be centralized at the
national level. This system will also promote uniformity in case outcomes as all IP
appeals cases—regardless of geography—are brought to the national level. While the
court is still new and untested, the structure of the body will likely further centralize
IP adjudication powers, increase case uniformity, and promote greater specialization
among the judges that rule on IP cases.
D. Technical Investigators and Expert Assessors
In addition to reforms targeted at the judicial system itself, other recent reforms
have also introduced technical investigators (技术调查官) to the IP courts and expert
assessors (专家型人民陪审员) to the IP tribunals in order to improve the technical fact
finding abilities of China’s IPR regime. Because of the technical complexity of IP cases,
even judges with scientific or technical backgrounds might not have the requisite
Proposal to Establish National IP Appellate Court], CHINA.ORG.CN (Sept. 1, 2017), http://www.china.
com.cn/news/txt/2017-09/01/content_41514812.htm.
110 Xinying Dou, Chengli Zhishi Chanquan Shangsu Fayuan Tongyi Falü Shiyong Biaozhun—
Fang Quanguo Zhengxie Weiyuan, Zhongguo Kexie Yuan Fu Zhuxi Zhang Qin (成立知识产权上诉法院
统一法律适用标准—访全国政协委员、中国科协原副主席张勤) [Establishing an IP Appellate Court to
Unify Legal Standards—an Interview with CPPCC Member and Former Vice Chairman of China
Association for Science and Technology, Zhang Qin], CHINA INTELL. PROP. NEWS (Mar. 21, 2018),
http://www.iprchn.com/cipnews/news_content.aspx?newsId=106705.
111 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhishi Chanquan Fating Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (最高人民
法院关于知识产权法庭若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Several
Issues with the IP Tribunal], (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 27, 2018, effective Jan. 1,
2019), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., Dec. 28, 2018, http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-137481.html.
112 Id.
113 Interviews CD-0523181L and CD-0629181U.
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subject matter expertise for a case. Historically, China has relied on a system similar
to the United States where litigants bring in expert witnesses to discuss the technical
facts of the case. However, because each side brings their own expert witnesses, judges
frequently do not get a clear, impartial understanding of the technical facts in a case.
According to one former American expert witness, there is an immense pressure to
fudge the facts or cast them in the best light possible to achieve the result one party
desires. 114 One lawyer noted that the expert witnesses brought in by litigants
frequently do more to obfuscate the judgment of judges than clarify the facts.115
In order to overcome this difficulty, the SPC promulgated the Interim Provisions
on Several Issues Concerning the Participation of Technical Investigators in
Intellectual Property Courts in Litigation Activities. 116 These Provisions create an
office within the court to manage technical investigators and states that technical
investigators can be assigned to any technically complex civil and administrative cases
involving patents, new plant varieties, integrated circuit layout designs, technical
trade secrets, computer software. 117 In terms of transparency, the provisions also
proscribe that any case in which a technical investigator is involved must have their
name listed on court proceedings and all parties must be notified within three days
pursuant to the relevant sections of the Civil Procedure Law and/or the Administrative
Procedure Law.118
The courts have begun recruiting experts and scholars from universities, industry
groups, and administrative agencies with the technical knowledge to help establish
facts in court. These technical investigators function as the “technical translators,
technical assistants, technical staffs” of the judges.119 As a technical expert to the judge,
technical investigators have access to case files, attend court proceedings, can question
the parties, and implement evidence preservation orders for the court (as seen in the
Autodesk and Adobe case). At the end of the trial, the technical investigator may
submit a technical review opinion (技术审查意见书) to the court in order to assist judges
with laying out the facts so the judge can properly apply the law.
Overall the system has been very effective. After just one year of implementing
the technical investigator system, the Beijing IP Court had a total of 25 technical
investigators (including 8 exchange technical investigators and 17 part-time technical
investigators) participating in the identification of technical facts in cases.120 In total,
Interview CD-0605181U.
Interview BJ-0419181L.
116 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan Jishu Diaocha Guan Canyu Susong
Huodong Ruogan Wenti de Zhanhang Guiding (最高人民法院关于知识产权法院技术调查官参与诉讼活
动 若 干 问 题 的 暂 行 规 定 ) [Interim Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Participation of
Technical Investigators in Intellectual Property Courts in Litigation Activities] (promulgated by the
Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 31, 2014), SUP. PEOPLE’S CT., Dec. 31, 2014, http://www.chinaiprlaw.cn/index.
php?id=504 [hereinafter SPC Interim Provisions].
117 Id. at art. 1 and art. 2.
118 Id. at art. 3 and art. 4.
119 Beijing Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan: Zhi Chan Zhuanyehua Shenpan de “chi pangxie ren” (北京
知识产权法院：知产专业化审判的“吃螃蟹人”) [Beijing Intellectual Property Court: “Daring Innovation”
in the Specialized Trial of Intellectual Property], XINHUA (Jan. 4, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/
legal/2019-01/04/c_1210030173.htm
120 Beijing Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan Yinru Jishu Diaocha Guan Zhidu Yi Zhounian Jie’an Lü
Tisheng 87% (北京知识产权法院引入技术调查官制度一周年结案率提升 87%) [After the First Year
Anniversary of the Introduction of the Technical Investigator System by the Beijing Intellectual
114
115
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technical investigators participated in 250 cases, made 128 court appearances, and
assisted with 14 preservation and inspection investigations. 121 The technical
investigators provided 122 consultations and wrote a total of 110 technical review
opinions.122 After the introduction of technical investigators to the Beijing IP Court,
the closing rate for technically complicated cases increased 87 percent over the
previous year.123
At the same time, mechanisms exist to prevent bias from entering the process.
While there is general agreement that technical investigators are fairly neutral in their
opinions, if a party believes a technical investigator lacks objectivity in the case, their
attorneys can file a motion to have the judge remove the technical investigator from
the case.124
Although less expansive than the technical expert system in the IP courts, the
expert assessors that participate in IP tribunal cases similarly provide technical
support to judges in cases with technically complex fact patterns. The technical
assessors are usually on loan to the court from the relevant administrative agencies
such as the Chinese National Intellectual Property Administration (formerly the State
Intellectual Property Office) for patent and trademark cases. For example, the Wuhan
IP Tribunal consulted with the State Intellectual Property Office’s Hubei Center for
Patent Review to hire five senior patent examiners to participate in trials as experts.125
The Chengdu IP Tribunal has adopted a two judge and one technical assessor model
similar to the IP courts to help assist judges with the technical facts of their cases.
These reforms have strengthened the fact-finding capabilities of the courts and
tribunals and have increased the level of professionalism and fairness of trials in
China’s IPR regime.
E. SPC Guiding Case System
The creation of specialized IP courts and tribunals and the introduction of
technical experts and assessors to proceedings have contributed dramatically to the
centralization of IP adjudication authority while simultaneously strengthening the
technical ability of the judicial system to rule on cases in a professional way. However,
ensuring that lower courts rule in ways that support the center’s policy direction has
been difficult given China’s unique legal development. In common law systems like the
United States, courts follow the principle of stare decisis that binds lower courts to
higher court decisions and creates case law through court decisions. China, on the
other hand, is a civil law country where statutory law reigns supreme and judges are

Property Court, the Case Closing Rate Increased by 87%], (Nov. 11, 2016), http://www.chinaiprlaw.cn/
index.php?id=4471.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Interview SH-0407181L; see also SPC Interim Provisions, supra note 116, at art. 5.
125 Li Yizhong ( 李 亦 中 ), Wuhan Zhishi Chanquan Shenpanting Tuixing Minshi Xingshi
Xingzheng “Sanshenheyi” Moshi (武汉知识产权审判庭推行民事刑事行政“三审合一”模式) [Wuhan IP
Tribunal promotes the “three-in-one” model of civil, criminal, and administrative cases], Changjiang
Ribao (长江日报) [CHANGJIANG DAILY] (Feb. 23, 2017), http://news.cjn.cn/sywh/201702/ t2966414.htm.

[19:1 2020]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property

166

supposed to “apply, not make, the law.”126 This means that Chinese courts do not have
this judicial mechanism at their disposal. In order to overcome this institutional
constraint, the SPC issued provisions establishing the guiding case system (GCS) (案
例指导制度) in order “to summarize adjudication experiences, unify the application of
law, enhance adjudication quality, and safeguard judicial impartiality.”127 The SPC
selects and publishes guiding cases (指导性案例) that lower courts must take into
account when adjudicating similar cases. As of the June 27, 2018 release, the SPC has
issued 96 guiding cases, 21 of which are related to IP cases. In many ways the GCS
shares a similar logic with common law precedent. The GCS seeks to promote
uniformity and predictability in the legal system as well as enhance the ability of
courts to effectively handle legislative ambiguity.128
Nevertheless, the GCS differs from common law precedent in a number of
substantive ways. Importantly, the intent of the GCS is simply to guide judicial
interpretation, not bind decisions. As Gechlik, Zhang, and Huang note:
Article 7 of the Provisions provides that courts in China merely “should,”
rather than “must,” “refer to” GCs [guiding cases] when adjudicating similar
cases. The lack of expressions stating that judges are obligated to follow and
cite GCs reflects the SPC’s concern that, because of the unclear legal status
of GCs, these cases cannot be binding.129
In addition to the intent of the GCS, its institutional structure also makes it quite
different from common law systems. First, the guiding cases themselves are not
sources of law. Judicial decisions still must be firmly rooted in statutory law. Second,
although judges at all levels can write and submit cases to be included in the GCS, it
is far more centralized than the decentralized lawmaking powers of common law
judges. Stare decisis is characterized as a decentralized and localized method of
jurisprudence while the GCS is centralized in the hands of the SPC. Finally, guiding
cases do not emerge organically like precedents in common law systems; they are
heavily edited by the SPC and “top-down selectors abstract holdings out of cases and
rewrite the facts and reasoning in a much more centralized process of judicial
policymaking.”130
Some have noted that the guiding cases have not been widely cited in judicial
decisions since its implementation. For example, between 2014 and 2015, Stanford
researchers found only 181 references in court decisions citing guiding cases and

Woo, supra note 54, at 260.
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Anli Zhidao Gongzuo de Guiding (最高人民法院关于案例指导
工 作 的 规 定 ) [Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court Concerning Work on Case Guidance]
(promulgated by the Adjudication Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Nov. 15, 2010, effective Nov. 26,
2010), CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT, http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding- cases-rules/20101126english/.
128 Mark Jia, Note, Chinese Common Law? Guiding Cases and Judicial Reform, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2213, 2232 (2016).
129 Mei Gechlik, Chenchen Zhang, and Li Huang, China’s Case Guidance System: Application and
Lessons Learned (Part I), STAN. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (Mar. 1, 2018),
http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/ guiding-cases-surveys.
130 Jia, supra note 128, at 2232.
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Peking University found only 241.131 Only half of all guiding cases were cited at all
with around 42 percent of those cited referencing a single guiding case (#24) regarding
traffic accidents. Lawyers that work on IP cases consider the low citation rate to be
primarily due to two factors: (1) because there is no clear standard for determining
what cases are to be considered similar cases that require citation, judges frequently
decide not to cite a case and (2) because there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure
that judges are citing cases, many decide not to cite out of bureaucratic inertia.132
However, it is important to note that even if judges are not widely citing guiding
cases, it does not mean that the system itself is wholly ineffective. Indeed, “judges have
frequently opted to engage in implicit, or ‘hidden’ application by invoking the ‘spirit’ of
a guiding case without directly citing it.”133 In fact, it seems that many judges are
aware of the GCS and consider it, even if they do not cite them explicitly in their
judicial rulings. According to survey data from Stanford Law School’s China Guiding
Cases Project, in 2013 roughly 38.9 percent of judges considered guiding cases while
adjudicating cases, however, in 2014 that number increased by 15.4 percentage points
to 54.3 percent.134 While this is good progress, it also demonstrates the bureaucratic
inertia that makes institutional reform in China challenging. Even as Beijing attempts
to centralize guidance over lower courts and ensure compliance with central directives
through the GCS, implementation can still be slow.
Although these trends demonstrate that judicial reforms are moving in the right
direction, the GCS has had a more significant impact on how lawyers litigate cases.
One analysis demonstrated that lawyers are three times more likely to refer to guiding
cases in their submissions and oral arguments than judges.135 Many lawyers in the IP
system believe that the guiding cases are useful persuasive tools in IP litigation.136
One lawyer said that because of the role that being overturned on appeal plays in
judicial promotion, judges are disinclined to rule against persuasive uses of guiding
cases even if they don’t explicitly cite them. The lawyer believed that “if judges are not
following the logic of the guiding cases, they better have a good reason.”137
The main objective of the GCS is to strengthen central control over lower courts
by selecting cases that support central directives and unify rulings by limiting the
amount of discretion individual judges have in deciding cases. In IP cases, where
technical complexity and the rapid growth of dockets have made it difficult to ensure
consistent rulings in line with the CCP’s policy agenda, the Beijing IP Court has piloted
the use of case law with positive results. In April 2015, the SPC established the IP
Case Guidance and Research Base at the Beijing IP Court. 138 The primary
131 Jeremy Daum, The Curious Case of China’s Guiding Cases System, CHINA L. TRANSLATE (Feb.
21, 2017), https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/the-curious-case-of-chinas-guiding-casessystem/?lang=en.
132 Interviews BJ-0419181L, CD-0525181L, CD-0525182L, and CD-0619181L.
133 Jia, supra note 128, at 2226-27.
134 Mei Gechlik, Dimitri Philips, & Oma Lee, Survey of Judges in China (2013-2014), STAN. L.
SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES PROJECT (Aug. 2014), http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guiding-cases-surveys/.
135 Mei Gechlik, Minmin Zhang, and Liyi Ye, Cumulative Analysis of All Subsequent Cases
Referring to Guiding Cases in China (2014 Q1-2015 Q4), STAN. L. SCH. CHINA GUIDING CASES
PROJECT, (Jan. 2016), http://cgc.law.stanford.edu/guidingcases-surveys/.
136 Interviews SH-0407181L, BJ-0419182L, and CQ-0623181L.
137 Interview CD-0525181L.
138 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Zhishi Chanquan Anjian Shenpan Gongzuo Zongshu (最高人民法院知
识产权案件审判工作综述) [Summary of the Trial Work of Intellectual Property Cases of the Supreme
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responsibility of the Base is to compile IP guiding cases, promote the use of guiding
cases in IP litigation, and serve as an IP case guidance service center for the rest of
the country.139 The Base also serves as an experimental point for implementing an IP
guiding case system. In many ways, it has been more successful than the national GCS
because it has several procedural issues and provided clear definitions of how the
system should function. These reforms have been outlined in two important policy
documents: the Procedural Guidelines for Applying Precedents in IP Trials (Draft) and
the Norms for Uniformity of Advocacy, Trial and Ruling of the Beijing IP Court (Draft),
however, they are still not publicly available.140
Judges Jiang Huiying and Yang Yi, who are directly working on the IP guiding
case reform at the Beijing IP Court, have publicly discussed some of the provisions and
how they will further unify IP case rulings.141 First, the system is meant to supplement
statutory law through the principle of “law is primary, cases are supplementary” (法律
为主、案例为辅).142 The goal of precedent in IP cases is not to create law, but rather to
explain the law where it is unclear, supplement the law where the law conflicts, and
create rules for when the law does not clearly specify how a ruling should be made.143
Although precedent will not be de jure binding, it will be de facto binding because if a
case outcome differs from a similar case, litigants may use this as grounds for appeal
or retrial. Second, article seven of the provisions specifically outlines how precedent
for IP guiding cases will function. This nine-tiered ranking starts with SPC guiding
cases and works its way down to basic-level courts: SPC guiding cases, SPC annual
cases, other SPC cases, Higher People’s Court model cases, Higher People’s Court
reference cases, other prior cases from Higher People’s Courts, Intermediate People’s
Court precedent, Basic People’s Court precedent, and “extraterritorial” precedent.144
Third, in stark contrast to how Chinese judicial opinions are usually written, judges in
the Beijing IP Court are required to include a larger and clearer discussion of
substantive facts, applicable laws, and any precedents with bearing on the case while
also paring down sections with less relevance to the ruling. For example, recent
research has shown that court opinions from the Beijing IP Court are 40-50 percent
shorter than the decisions of more traditional IP tribunals, even though the Beijing IP
Court deals with some of the most technically complicated cases in China.145 This is a
significant development that increases the utility of case rulings and also indicates a
growing professionalism among IP judges. Finally, the Beijing IP Court is building a
People’s Court], PEOPLE’S CT. DAILY (Feb. 29, 2016), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing16892.html.
139 Id.
140 Susan Finder, China’s Evolving Case Law System in Practice, 9 TSINGHUA L. REV., 245, 251
(2017).
141 Jiang Huiying (蒋惠岭) & Yang Yi (杨奕), Beijing Zhishi Chanquan Fayuan: Yi Xianli Panjue
Zhidao Shenpan Gongzuo Zhidu de Chuanxin Shijian (北京知识产权法院：以先例判决指导审判工作制
度的创新实践) [Beijing IP Court: Innovative Practice of Guiding the Judicial Work System with
Precedent Judgment], LEGAL DAILY (Apr. 6, 2016), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/fxjy/content/201604/06/content_6554635.htm.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Finder, supra note 140, at 250.
145 Max Goldberg, Enclave of Ingenuity: The Plan and Promise of the Beijing Intellectual
Property Court 42 (May 19, 2017) (B.A. Thesis, Yale University), https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/
ceas_student_work/4.
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database system for guiding cases as a resource for judges, lawyers, and scholars,
making it easier to find and reference guiding cases.
The most recent statistics show that from March 2015 to October 2016, the Beijing
IP Court cited guiding cases 168 times, of the litigants cited 121 and the judges cited
47.146 In 117 of these guiding cases citations, the judges followed them while the other
51 were disregarded due to difference in facts. 147 The total number of cases with
guiding case citations totaled 279.148 While this number remains small in comparison
to the Court’s overall caseload, the program is still relatively new. However, due to the
program’s success, the IP guiding case system is also already set to expand nationwide
at some point in the near future.149
The pilot IP guiding case system is an important development for IP law and has
several advantages over the national GCS. The reforms clarify the hierarchy of the
precedent system, establish mechanisms for selecting and citing case law, and provide
rules for when judges should follow or disregard guiding case “precedent” in a trial.
The reforms simultaneously accomplish the two main tasks of IP reform in China,
namely it strengthens central control by limiting the discretion of lower courts who are
bound by the centrally selected IP guiding cases while also strengthening the overall
professional quality of judicial decisions because judges are forced to rule consistently
based on de facto binding precedent, clearly articulate the facts, and provide sound
legal reasoning for their decisions. This system simultaneously centralizes authority
and improves uniformity and quality of IP adjudication.
V. CONCLUSION
This article examines the reforms China has pursued to centralize judicial
authority, build judicial professionalism, and create case uniformity within the IP
adjudication system. Policymakers have recognized that the underlying drivers of
growth must transition from agricultural and industrial production to a more
sustainable and innovative service sector. While China has long been viewed as the
“world’s factory,” home to low-quality manufactured goods and technologies copied
from abroad, as its economy has rapidly expanded, so has its innovative capabilities.
Many of its domestic firms are already global leaders in their fields and, as a result,
China has demonstrated serious resolve to create an effective domestic IPR regime to
protect its national economic interests.
By creating specialized IP courts, tribunals, and a national appellate tribunal,
introducing technical investigators and expert assessors to court proceedings, and
promulgating a guiding case system, China has both centralized IP adjudication
powers and also created a stronger national IPR enforcement regime. This process has
important implications for how China understands the role of law and the courts in
structuring society, mediating the competing centripetal forces of central control and
146 Su Chi (宿迟), Beijing Zhischi Chanquan Fayuan Liang Zhounian Gongzuo Qingkuang Baogao
(北京知识产权法院两周年工作情况报告) [The Beijing IP Court’s Second Anniversary Work Report]
(Jan. 10, 2017), http://www.cpahkltd.com/cn/info.aspx?n=20170119084747040064.
147 Id.
148 Id.
149 Jiang & Yang, supra note 141.
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local autonomy, and how economic materialist interests impact institutional
implementation. These issues are particularly interesting as they provide a valuable
case study with which to examine the changing conception of legality in contemporary
Chinese society.
This article also outlines important reforms that have significant practical
applications for addressing what China’s IP reforms means for China’s future. The
judicial reforms discussed above have ensured that the central leadership’s objective
of strengthening IP enforcement is being achieved at the local level. There are now
fewer opportunities for local judicial protectionism to influence case outcome and the
specialized courts and tribunals have increased the uniformity and efficiency of
proceedings. Similarly, these institutional changes have also ensured that judges and
the courts can rule on the technically complex cases that come before them while also
increasing their levels of uniformity and professionalism through stronger fact-finding
capabilities and more precise mechanisms to guide interpretation of the law. Although
there is certainly room for further improvement, China has clearly already made
significant progress in strengthening its IPR regime to meet the demands of its
economic transition.
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VI. APPENDIX

A. Table 1. China’s Major Domestic Intellectual Property Laws
Law
Trademark Law

Date of Entry
into Force
Mar. 1, 1983

Amendments
Feb. 22, 1993

Type of Intellectual
Property Protection
Protects brands

Oct. 27, 2001
Aug. 30, 2013
Patent Law

Apr. 1, 1985

Sept. 4, 1992
Aug. 25, 2000

Protects innovations
and designs

Dec. 27, 2008
Copyright Law

June 1, 1991

Oct. 27, 2001
Apr. 1, 2010

Protects works of
authorship

Anti-unfair
Competition Law

Dec. 1, 1993

Nov. 4, 2017

Protects trade secrets

Regulations on the
Protection of New
Varieties of Plants

Mar. 1, 1997

Mar. 1, 2013

Protects new varieties
of plants

Regulations on the
Protection of
Layout-Designs of
Integrated
Circuits

Oct. 1, 2001

—

Protects the layoutdesigns of integrated
circuits

Source: WIPO Lex.
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B. Table 2. Major Intellectual Property Treaties to which China has Acceded
Treaty
Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial
Property

Date of Accession
Mar. 19, 1985

Contents
Provides protection of IP
and sets forth provisions
for national treatment,
priority right, and
common rules.

Madrid Agreement
Concerning the
International
Registration of Marks

Oct. 4, 1989

Provides a unified
procedure for registering
international trademarks

Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and
Artistic Works

Oct. 15, 1992

Provides protection for
copyright by mandating
national treatment,
registration-free
copyright, and minimum
standards/exclusive
rights of authorization

Patent Cooperation
Treaty

Jan. 1, 1994

Provides a unified
procedure for establishing
a filing date for
international patent
applications

Agreement on TradeRelated Aspects of
Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS)

Dec. 11, 2001

Introduces
comprehensive standard
IP rights, enforcement,
and dispute resolution
procedures into the
international trading
system

Source: WIPO Lex.
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C. Table 3. Specialized IP Courts and Tribunals with Cross-Regional Jurisdiction
IP Court or
Tribunal
Beijing IP
Court

Date
Established
Nov. 6, 2014

Territorial
Jurisdiction
Beijing Municipality

Jurisdiction Type

Guangzhou IP
Court

Dec. 16, 2014

Guangdong Province

Specialized IP Court
with provincial
jurisdiction

Shanghai IP
Court

Dec. 28, 2014

Shanghai
Municipality

Specialized IP Court
with provincial
jurisdiction

Chengdu IP
Tribunal

Jan. 9, 2017

Sichuan Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Nanjing IP
Tribunal

Jan. 19, 2017

Nine prefectures in
Jiangsu Province:
Nanjing, Zhenjiang,
Yangzhou, Taizhou,
Yancheng, Huai’an,
Suqian, Xuzhou, and
Lianyungang

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over part of a
province

Suzhou IP
Tribunal

Jan. 19, 2017

Four prefectures in
Jiangsu Province:
Suzhou, Wuxi,
Changzhou, and
Nantong

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over part of a
province

Wuhan IP
Tribunal

Feb. 22, 2017

Hubei Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Hefei IP

Aug. 30, 2017

Anhui Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Sept. 8, 2017

Six prefectures in
Zhejiang Province:
Hangzhou, Jiaxing,

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction

Tribunal
Hangzhou IP
Tribunal

Specialized IP Court
with provincial
jurisdiction
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Huzhou, Jinhua,
Quzhou, and Lishui

over part of a
province

Ningbo IP
Tribunal

Sept. 8, 2017

Five prefectures in
Zhejiang Province:
Ningbo, Wenzhou,
Shaoxing, Taizhou,
and Zhoushan

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over part of a
province

Fuzhou IP
Tribunal

Sept. 28, 2017

Five prefectures in
Fujian Province:
Fuzhou, Putian,
Sanming, Nanping,
Ningde

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Jinan IP
Tribunal

Sept. 28, 2017

11 prefectures in
Shandong Province:
Jinan, Zibo,
Zaozhuang, Jining,
Tai’an, Laiwu,
Binzhou, Dezhou,
Liaocheng, Liyi, and
Heze

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over part of a
province

Qingdao IP
Tribunal

Sept. 30, 2017

Six prefectures in
Shandong Province:
Qingdao, Dongying,
Yantai, Weifang,
Weihai, and Rizhao

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over part of a
province

Shenzhen IP
Tribunal

Dec. 26, 2017

Shenzhen
Municipality

Specialized IP
Tribunal without
cross-regional
jurisdiction

Xi’an IP
Tribunal

Feb. 24, 2018

Shaanxi Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Tianjin IP
Tribunal

Mar. 1, 2018

Tianjin Municipality

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Changsha IP
Tribunal

Mar. 1, 2018

Hunan Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province
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Zhengzhou IP
Tribunal

Mar. 2, 2018

Henan Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Nanchang IP
Tribunal

July 5, 2018

Jiangxi Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Changchun IP
Tribunal

Dec. 26, 2018

Jilin Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Lanzhou IP
Tribunal

Jan. 5, 2019

Gansu Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

IP Appellate
Tribunal
(Supreme People’s
Court)

Jan. 1, 2019

National Level

--

Xiamen IP
Tribunal

Sept. 5, 2019

Four prefectures in
Fujian Province:
Xiamen, Zhangzhou,
Quanzhou, and
Longyan

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over part of a
province

Haikou IP
Tribunal

Sept. 26, 2019

Hainan Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Urumqi IP
Tribunal

Proposed but
not yet
established

Xinjiang Province

Specialized IP
Tribunal with crossregional jurisdiction
over entire province

Source: Author’s compilation.
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D. Table 4. List of Interviews
Date

Location

Affiliation

Position

03/16/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

University

Professor

Interview
Code
CD-0316181L

04/07/2018

Shanghai,
Shanghai

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

SH-0407181L

04/19/2018

Beijing, Beijing

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

BJ-0419181L

04/19/2018

Beijing, Beijing

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

BJ-0419182L

05/23/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CD-0523181L

05/25/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CD-0525181L

05/25/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CD-0525182L

06/05/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

University

Former
Technical
Expert
Witness

CD-0605181U

06/06/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Entrepreneur

CD-0606181I

06/06/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Entrepreneur

CD-0606182I

06/06/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Entrepreneur

CD-0606183I

06/08/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CD-0608181L

06/12/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Art

CD-0612181I

06/12/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Music

CD-0612182I

06/15/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Technology

CD-0615181I

06/15/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Industry

Telecom

CD-0615182I

06/19/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CD-0619181L

06/21/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CD-0621181L

06/23/2018

Chongqing,
Chongqing

Law Firm

IP Lawyer

CQ-0623181L

06/23/2018

Chongqing,
Chongqing

Judicial
System

Official

CQ-0623182O

06/23/2018

Chongqing,
Chongqing

Administra
tive Organ

Official

CQ-0623183O

06/29/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

University

Professor

CD-0629181U

06/29/2018

Chengdu, Sichuan

University

Professor

CD-0629182U
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E. Figure 1. First Instance IP Cases by Type of Case.
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F. Figure 2. First Instance Civil IP Cases by IP Type
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